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Abstract-As electronic commerce will increase, players will
increasingly wish to have signed documents and strong encryp-
tion. According to current knowledge, it must be expected that
the costs of attacking, through Trojan horses, crypto impleme n-
tations on computers with mainstream operating systems, are
low. This threatens legal certainty, either because such Trojan
horses will emerge, or because their effect will be claimed. Also,
they may attack encryption tools. It is discussed that it should be
possible to build secure systems in a way that impersonation and
eavesdropping is completely implausible. Some requirements for
such solutions are discussed. It is concluded that on different
market segments, different computers will be used, varying es-
sentially in functionality, screen size, means of input, and degree
of tamper resistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Components such as software and smartcards for encrypt-
ing or for digitally signing documents are typically used in
computers which cannot reliably be protected against viri or
Trojan horses from the Internet. Even companies who manu-
facture such components have, in the past, been victimised.
Regarding encryption, it must be expected that either the se-
crets will be easvesdropped when somewhere in the clear, or
the passwords, or that “dual use” encryption software will
install itself unnoticed by the users. Regarding signature so-
lutions, it must be anticipated that other information will be
visualised than signed, which threatens both the signing and
the relying party. Alternatively, signers might in case of a
conflict simply claim to have become a victim. These threats
are discussed in Section II. Subsequently, existing counter-
measures are discussed (III). In Section IV, secure computers
are discussed as a remedy. They can be designed to protect
critical applications from untrustworthy code even in the
hands of laypersons. User requirements and design options
for these are discussed. It is concluded that, today, secure
Linux PCs and PDA-phones are the most promising objec-
tives of migration (Section V). Without such secure comput-
ers, electronic commerce could be threatened by attacks or
just rumours and claimed attacks, which may severely dete-
riorate usage of electronic commerce.
The scenarios imagined for this paper are transactions the
value of which is definitely beyond what players wish to bear
as a damage. Today, they typically demand, as a business
rule, a signed paper document. In electronic commerce, with
high value, they won’t wish to rely on good will case of dis-
putes. Values worth the effort will be concerned if, e.g.,
somebody does remote banking owning accounts worth Euro
100,000, or if a self-employed person makes a Euro 10,000
transaction, or if a small company makes a Euro 1,000,000
contract. With these types of transactions the threat for the
players is significant, while the number of future players can
be anticipated to be in the range of at least hundreds of thou-
sands, thus allowing for mass production of the means of
protection discussed. Of course, large companies which can
bear larger risks will also use the tools if cost-efficient.
II. TROJAN HORSES
A. Direct Trojan Horse Attacks
1. General
This paper1 discusses Trojan horses being created with the
intention of damaging somebody in electronic commerce
over open networks. “A Trojan horse is a computer program
that appears to the user to perform a legitimate function but in
fact carries out some illicit function that the user of the pro-
gram did not intend.” ([12] p. 75). In the context of electronic
commerce, Trojan Horses can be used to steal secrets, such as
business data, keys or passwords, or to misrepresent data to
be signed or verified. It has been demonstrated how easy it is
to develop a login-window being a Trojan horse capturing
passwords [37]. Alternatively, a Trojan horse could look like
an update of a program, a useful plug-in, a macro, a tool ap-
parently providing free access to something, etc. A Trojan
horse attack may be restricted to a few recipients or even tar-
get one single victim only. Individuals could be specifically
deceived at different times and in different places, so that
they would have considerable difficulty in making the dam-
ages believable. Also, the Trojan horse could delete itself
after the attack was made.
Trojan horse incidents have been reported in the security
literature [23, 13]. Examples include a modification of Telnet
which captured all passwords ([23], see also [34]). An exa m-
ple of a Trojan horse which caused financial damage was one
which produced excessive phone bills to the benefit of insid-
ers with a foreign telecom provider [26]. In [28] it was re-
ported about a virus which infected a homebanking transac-
tion using a Java-applet. In March 1998, some German pupils
developed a Trojan horse attacking password files in imple-
mentations of Internet access software of the provider T-
Online.
The Melissa virus demonstrated that users can easily be
lead to neglect any security precautions such as not to run
code from untrustworthy sources. Reportedly, it displayed a
                                                                
1 The author wishes to thank Gérard Lacoste, James Riordan, Josef Siman,
Dimitri Tchekoff, and Michael Waidner for valuable suggestions. This work
has been partially supported by EU-project SEMPER, but it represents the
author’s view. Some of the findings presented are based on surveys made for
SEMPER.
message: “Here is that document you asked for ... don't show
anyone else ;-) ” 1.2 mio victims have been reported [3, 31].
Also the ExploreZip Worm of 1999 fooled users. It gave the
impression that an individual the recipient knows sent com-
pressed files, and used a Winzip Icon to make users run the
malicious executable [21].
Note that Trojan horses can also be put into hardware. Re-
portedly, a hacker had manipulated CAD-files of Motorola
cellular phones. “When Shimomura tracked Kevin Mitnick
and captured him ... the files that ... he discovered cached
away by Mitnick included ... CAD files... What it means is
that if I can take a CAD file from Motorola’s cellular ASIC
that will be manufactured in quantity millions, alter the CAD
file, put a hardware Trojan horse in, put them back, and have
them compile into hardware, which is then embedded in
manufactured devices that go out in quantity millions, I’ve
created a basic insecurity in those devices in which we trust
everything.” [11]
2. Encryption
Recently the US government discussed to “covertly gain
access to personal computers” for obtaining confidential in-
formation [7]. The FBI is planned to be granted $80 mio. for
research on methods for decrypting messages [14]. The Aus-
tralian Security Intelligence Organisation reportedly wrote:
“The opportunity may present itself... to alter software lo-
cated in premises used by subjects of intensive investiga-
tion... The software (or more rarely the hardware) may relate
to communication, data storage, encoding, encryption or
publishing devices... (S)ome modifications ... may create an
intelligent memory, a permanent set of commands not speci-
fied in the program written by the manufacturer... The advent
of widespread use of strong encryption ... will necessitate ...
methods ... to acquire keys or passwords.” [3] It has been
discussed in crypto groups that one could produce back-
doored versions of crypto applications, such as SSL or PGP,
and replace the real ones on people’s computers (“dual use”
crypto). Reportedly, the European Union’s confidential posi-
tions in the GATT negotiations in 1995 has been communi-
cated to the US, through a Trojan horse in routers of the
European Parliament [32].
3. Digital Signatures
It must be expected that criminals will aim at attacking
digital signature solutions through Trojan horses. Already in
1994, in the discussions preceding the creation of the German
Digital Signature Law, Roßnagel et al. demonstrated that a
misbehaving employee can change files another employee
wishes to sign without the latter noticing the change [29].
This was not a Trojan horse attack through software on the
network, but rather a physical attack through a human being
in the room, but it cannot be excluded that such an attack can
be done remotely and cheaply.
The significance of the threat is also visible on the Eu-
ropay France homepage. They define, using the well-known
word ‘virus’: “‘(N)on-WYSIWYG‘ viruses: refers to viruses
which are capable of displaying on-screen different informa-
tion from that used in the actual payment under way... (They)
are programs in their own right which can be transmitted by
means of an infected diskette, through a local network, an
FTP download, a message received with an attachment, or
simply by viewing an Internet Web page (via Java applets or
Active X). Some viruses (although still rare) act as logic
bombs, lying dormant in a system, awaiting specific trigger
events before acting. Possible trigger events include the de-
tection of an X509-standard file which might constitute a
customer certificate, the presence of a non-encrypted card
number along the computer's internal bus, or the entry of PIN
used to unlock a credit card number.” [10]
Also in the US, already in 1995 a White Paper by the
APSON group (Advanced Payment Systems for Open Net-
works) arrived at the conclusion that “protected devices” are
required for secure payments: “Protected devices encompass
more than the card/token, but include reader/keyboard (I/O)
as well. This is to prevent Trojan horse attacks for input and
interfacing the protected device.” ([2] p. 7)
In 1998, Juenemann, Security Architect of Novell, dis-
cussed Trojan horses attacking signature solutions [17]. The
issue also emerged in debates organised by the US Federal
Trade Commission about consumer protection in electronic
commerce, where Ellison (Intel) and Winn wrote: “It would
be more difficult for malfeasors to access the key used in the
consumer's authentication procedure if the systems for con-
trolling access stored the key on a separate token such as a
smartcard or required a biometric identifier. Even such more
sophisticated access controls may be defeated by attacks such
as virus software running on the consumer's computer but not
under the consumer's control and without the consumer's
knowledge.” They conclude: “There are no systems which
remain trustworthy when exposed to normal consumer Inter-
net use and software acquis ition.” [46]
4. Significance
Also researchers from IBM point out that Trojan horses
are a significant threat, such as Waidner or Gordon and
Chess. “The most fundamental problem in security in general
is to find a trustworthy computing base. In electronic com-
merce ... this is particularly important for end users’ devices
because anything a user can do online, a successful attacker
against these devices can do, too.” [40] Or, regarding busi-
ness use: “(A) tailored Trojan horse attack could be devas-
tating to a business”. [13]
Such attacks could not only be made by criminals through
the network, but also by network managers, maintenance or
repair staff. Also insiders could perform attacks, which would
be very difficult to detect. In cash dispenser systems, dishon-
est bank employees repeatedly withdrew money from cus-
tomers’ bank accounts. The first victims had a very difficult
time to make themselves believed [16, 45, 1].
In general, Trojan horse attacks are made more difficult if
smartcards are used to store keys and perform the crypto pro-
cesses. For the attack to work, the card needs to be inserted.
Nevertheless, it must be assumed that there are ways to attack
smartcard-based solutions. Confidential information could be
communicated to an eavesdropper as long as the text is in the
clear elsewhere. In signature applications, what is displayed
could be different from what the smartcard actually signs.
Either the document would be altered and the fake one dis-
played for only a very short period of time, so that it appears
like a flicker. Or the Trojan horse would have the smartcard
sign a second document, unnoticed by the user, possibly later.
In interviews experts estimated that it might be a few days’ or
a few weeks’ work to develop a Trojan horse which attacks a
smartcard-based solution on normal PCs on the Internet [42].
The relevance of Trojan horses can also be seen from the
fact that banks and certification authorities request from cus-
tomers to keep their systems free of any malicious code.
Verisign prescribes “each certificate applicant shall securely
generate his, her, or its own private key, using a trustworthy
system, and take necessary precautions to prevent its com-
promise, loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use”
[36]. In their ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, they demand to
“(t)ake measures to protect your computer from viruses, be-
cause a virus may be able to attack a private key” [39]. Also
German certification authorities, such as TC Trust and Deut-
sche Telekom request that users make sure that they protect
signature components against the influence of Trojan horses.2
B. Indirect Trojan Horse Attacks
Whereas so far we have been thinking of a criminal at-
tacking a signature or encryption application, in a way that
either other data are signed than visualised, or encrypted data
are sent in the clear to the eavesdropper, there is also the
threat that passwords be eavesdropped and abused in a differ-
ent context, such as a homebanking application or a physical
cash dispenser. It must be assumed that in particular users
operating many access systems will re-use passwords and can
thus be attacked in other areas.
C. Claimed Trojan Horse Attacks
A different threat is that a signer may claim to have been
impersonated without actually having been so. This is a risk
for the relying party. It may come into effect, e.g., at court
when a judge rules that the conditions imposed by a certifica-
tion authority onto a signer are unfair as impersonation can-
not be prevented when using normal computers on the Inter-
net.
D. The Risk
To best knowledge, little damage has yet been produced
with Trojan horses attacking e-commerce solutions. It must
be anticipated, however, that with the increase in e-
commerce, attacks will increase.
Regarding digital signatures, once they will be in wide-
spread use, attacks will probably be aimed at, e.g., by organ-
ised crime, much like attacks on debit cards, or European
Sky-TV and phone cards only emerged after massive de-
ployment had taken place and thus attacks became economi-
cally attractive. The risk of a signing party claiming, in case
of a dispute, the effect of a Trojan horse is difficult to esti-
mate. But it must be assumed it exists. Also, it must be ex-
pected that hackers will try to demonstrate any weaknesses to
the public. In any case, as certification authorities demand
that users protect themselves against malicious code, the risk
seems worth to be addressed.
                                                                
2 TCTrust requests "Es ist sicherzustellen, daß sich auf den verwendeten
Geräten keine Viren oder schädigende Software befinden, die zu einer Preis-
gabe der Identifikationsdaten oder der geheimen Schlüssel führen können,
oder den Signier- oder Signaturprüfvorgang verfälschen können." [33] Deut-
sche Telekom recommend: “Verhindern Sie eine Beeinflussung der Signa-
turkomponenten durch Computerviren, trojanische Pferde...” [6] p.7
Regarding encryption, it must be expected that economic
espionage will be aimed through other channels, now that
business secrets are increasingly strongly encrypted when
transmitted.
Though one might be tempted to conclude from current
low damage that these risks are small, this can change
quickly, as the denial of service attack early in 2000 has
shown. Or, as Neumann put it: Risk analysis is risky.
III. EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES
A. Software Scanners
Typical advice given to users is (1) to refrain from running
untrustworthy code and (2) to use software scanners. Re-
garding the first, this is in contrary to common practice of
computer use of Internet users. Both business and private
users regularly have to obtain new software in order to be
able to use their computer as anticipated. Such software may
contain security holes, and it is very difficult to check that its
origin is really trustworthy. Furthermore, normal computer
use increasingly requires the download of plug-ins and app-
lets which makes this task even more difficult [24]. While it
may already be regarded unfair to request from a user to re-
frain from using such code, popular operating systems have a
tendency to increasingly execute code automatically, so that
in normal operation the user won’t even notice that untrusted
code is running [22].
Therefore the advice is given to use software scanners
such as Anti-Virus-software. Such software, however, cannot
necessarily detect a new Trojan horse. The Melissa virus
demonstrated that virus-protection can take days until it takes
effect [8]. In 1999, viri caused large security and computer
companies to temporarily shut down their email connections.
Thus, demanding from users to keep their machines secure
using scanners means demanding something being close to
impossible. The demand also faces the risk to be regarded
unfair at court.
Thompson [36] described how difficult it is to detect Tro-
jan horses. Scanners also cannot easily detect self-deleting
Trojan horses [13]. Last but not least, any attempt by secret
services to obtain business secrets through malicious code
may not necessarily be detected.
B. Code-signing
Possibly, future mainstream operating systems could use
code-signing mechanisms extensively. It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether this will produce sufficient protection for the
following reasons:
1. The operating systems may not be designed well enough
to offer reliable protection.
2. Many programmers will be allowed to produce signed
code, so criminal programmers will obtain a chance to
distribute malicious code. Foreign entities doing espio-
nage will certainly have means to get code signed.
3. Should certification of programmers or software comp a-
nies be handled very restrictively in order to combat the
aforementioned problem, there will be many programs
which users will wish to run which are simply not signed.
4. There is also the risk of certification authorities not
working properly or of fake certification authorities.
5. Furthermore, there is the possibility to change certificates
unnoticed by the user [30].
6. Signed code containing a Trojan horse may delete its sig-
nature after the attack has been made [18].
7. Using signed programs, it might be possible to create ma-
licious code, such as macros, which would possibly not be
detected as unsigned code.
Of course, one cannot exclude that future popular large op-
erating systems for laypersons will be highly secure, but,
judging from past experience, one has to anticipate the oppo-
site [24].
C. Special User I/O
In the realm of digital signatures, special user input and
output has been discussed to become a remedy. Software
viewers have the potential to be very flexible for displaying
different types of documents through some sort of bitmap.
The German Digital Signature Law requests secure visualis a-
tion: “Technical components with safeguards are required for
the generation and storage of signature keys and for the gen-
eration and verification of digital signatures which reliably
reveal forged digital signatures and manipulated signed data
and provide protection against unauthorised use of private
signature keys.” (German Law for Digital Signatures, § 14,
Section 1) Also the EU Directive says that users, when cre-
ating an “advanced electronic signature”, should do this “us-
ing means that the signatory can maintain under his sole con-
trol” (Article 2). They request in Annex III that the data “can
be reliably protected by the legitimate holder against the use
of others”, and that “secure signature creation devices must
not alter the data to be signed or prevent such data from being
presented to the signatory prior to the signature process”.[7]
It is being debated whether such secure visualisation is
needed. The ordinance accompanying the German law states
that such secure components will need only be used “as re-
quired”3. The EU discusses in its introduction: “Whereas An-
nex III covers requirements for secure signature-creation de-
vices to ensure the functionality of advanced electronic sig-
natures; whereas it does not cover the entire system environ-
ment in which such devices operate...” (item 15 of introduc-
tion) Nilsson et al. interpret this section: “This raises the
question on whether or not the presentation of the data to be
signed must be presented by the ‘secure signature creation
device’ and whether the presentation shall be done securely.
The answer in the Directive is left open” [25]. We must ex-
pect that the issue will arise in future court cases. Most likely
the ambiguity stems from the fact that no secure solutions
exist yet.
Viewers have started to emerge on the German market.
One has been certified according to ITSEC E2 under the as-
sumption that the machine is free of “untrustworthy soft-
ware.” [5]. Debis-ITSEC refer to a recommendation that the
users of the Utimaco Sign&Crypt solution, which complies to
the German digital signature law, are advised “not to install
untrustworthy software” [5]. Such software viewers for nor-
mal operating systems will most likely not qualify for E4. So
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the use of such software viewers will make attacks more dif-
ficult, but still does not provide a very robust solution, as
users are assumed to keep their machines secure.
Special hardware viewers have the potential to provide a
much better protection, such as the Bull Safepad, a smartcard
reader with a PIN-pad and a 32-characters display. Such a
special signing device can probably be well protected against
malicious code. Three questions, however, emerge:
1. Why would private users be willing to buy special de-
vices? Or, alternatively, will banks or certification
authorities be willing to subsidise them?
2. Why would business users be willing to pay for them if
normal business documents cannot be viewn or edited on
them? If, alternatively, one would equip them with suffi-
cient means, wouldn’t they become as expensive as a full-
fledged palmtop computer or PDA?
3. As such devices have certain costs, it would make sense
that holders use them with different computers. Would
they be willing to carry them around for using them in the
office, at home, while travelling or perhaps even at the
point of sale?
Also plans by companies such as Brokat or Sonera to use
mobile phones as secure input and output show that players
see the risk needs to be addressed. Here, the task is to design
subscriber cards and mobile phones sufficiently secure.
Again, it is unclear how to handle normal business docu-
ments.
With both mobile phones and special smartcard readers,
there is a possibility that they will be designed for only a few
applications approved by the issuer, in order to control the
security of such devices. This in turn will lead to inflexibility
on the user side.
D. Insurance
An alternative to developing highly secure devices might
be to insure the risk. Whereas, regarding signatures, this is a
possibility investigated by insurance companies4, we believe
research for technical remedies is needed for three reasons:
1. Economically weak parties may need protection as there
will be no usable proofs, much like with physical theft.
The insurance company will have little means to tell a
genuine victim from a criminal pretender.5 Thus, a genu-
ine victim faces the risk of not being able to successfully
claim compensation, as s(he) has no proofs. This may be a
moderate threat in low value transactions, and also one
which very large companies can bear. Private persons,
however, when doing valuable transactions, as well as
small companies and self-employed persons when partici-
pating in medium-value electronic commerce etc. (above
Euro 10,000 or 100,000), face a substantial threat.
                                                                
4 See, e.g., the E-Certify Indemnity Policy by Hiscox [15], though it does not
seem they insure relying parties trusting in signatures made by impostors.
5 Similarly, sometimes graphologic experts are in a difficult position in dispu-
tes of signatures on travellers’ cheques. In [39] it was reported about a case of
lost traveller’s cheques in which the customer did not get the money back as the
expert ruled that the second signature was the victim’s. With digital signatures,
it will be impossible to base a decision on whether a signature is genuine or
fake on the disputed sign ature.
2. Once digital signature technology will be in wide-spread
use and becomes attacked, damages may quickly increase
and insurance companies will demand technical counter-
measures in order to avoid unbearable insurance premi-
ums.
3. Regarding confidentiality, insurance may not help any-
way.
IV. SECURE COMPUTERS
A. Secure System Design
Summarising we can say that without secure devices with
secure user input and output, legal certainty and confidential-
ity are at risk. This is of concern for private persons, small
companies, and even large organisations if the attack is sub-
stantial. What is needed are secure computers which are de-
signed in a way that [27]:
1. Trojan horses have no chance;
2. Users unambiguously see what they handle;
3. Users are securely identified; and
4. Lost or stolen devices cannot be abused.
In general, such devices will have to be open for different
applications, as chosen by the user. This means that if a large
provider, such as a telecom company or a certification
authority decides which applications will be allowed, this will
be insufficient in many environments. For instance, a com-
peting telecom company may not be able to recommend the
use of code of their choice. Or it will not be possible that a
buyer selects an encryption program of his or her choice.
Note that, e.g., companies or groups of companies will wish
to install code issued by themselves. Substantial scope for
altering the code is also required because program updates
will be necessary. Small systems with a closed design, al-
lowing, e.g., only for display of a few characters in a signa-
ture solution, can probably be designed well, but this does not
solve the problem in general, and faces the risk that it does
not sell well. The issue of running untrustworthy code will
certainly become more important once PDA-phones exploit
larger bandwidth.
Thus, in general an open design is needed. This means that
a secure operating system is beneficial [12]. Loscocco et al.
already pointed out that unfortunately providers of security
components do not sufficiently acknowledge their solutions’
dependence on the operating system’s security: “If security
practitioners were to more openly acknowledge their security
solution’s operating system dependencies and state these de-
pendencies as requirements for future operating systems, then
the increased demand for secure operating systems would
lead to new research and development in the area and ult i-
mately to commercially viable secure systems. In turn, the
availability of secure operating systems would enable secu-
rity practitioners to concentrate on security services that be-
long in their particular components rather than dooming them
to try to address the total security problem with no hope of
success.” [20]
So what would be needed is a solid base. Users should be
put into a position to make their own choice which applica-
tion thy trust. For example, they may wish that code signed
by their own certification authority is trusted. Thus, a secure
operating system will be a crucial element for having secure
devices. Such a system can allow the user to run trustworthy
and non-trustworthy applications on the same machine, as
long as they are well separated. Extensive penetration testing
of them is an essential requirement which can be reflected by
an appropriate certification level.
A secure operating system and a trustworthy source of the
applications is not necessarily enough. It must also be en-
sured that the hardware does not contain any Trojan horses.
This is of particular relevance if high-value business secrets
are to be encrypted. This may mean, e.g., that European busi-
nesses use chips designed, evaluated and produced in an envi-
ronment they can trust.
B. Components
1. Secure Cryptotools
As discussed elsewhere in the literature, secure crypto-
graphic components are necessary. This means, e.g., sufficient
key length, preparation for the use of a second algorithm in
case one is broken, etc.
2. Secure User Input and Output
Regarding output, several possibilities exist. The minimum
would be a display as used for WAP-phones. Next would be
displays of PDA-size. Large texts would either have to be
scrolled through, or a magnifying lens would be used (see
Fig. 1), a secure printout made, or a device the size of a lap-
top computer be used.
For digital signatures, it is possible to split the presentation
of the document, i.e. have the bulk of a contract on a normal
computer, and only display essential fields securely (see Fig.
2 and [43] for an example). Unambiguous fonts and layout
will be an essential element of any such visualis ation.
Fig. 1. Phone with magnifying screen (Kopin)
Fig. 2. Split user interface
Regarding input, the usage of passwords and passphrases
has been discussed versus the usage of biometric means.
While characters can be eavesdropped, biometrics may be
fooled and the legitimate owner be rejected, or a criminal
accepted. This discussion shall not be pursued here. Note that
what should be avoided is to have a PIN-pad which a user
only uses for entering a PIN, as this may lead to worn keys,
making PIN-guessing easier.
With normal cable connectors, there are reliable ways to
make sure with which other devices the secure device com-
municates. Using contactless interfaces, experience has
shown that it is much more difficult to define these. Already
in the ambitious St. Moritz trial made by the Swiss bank UBS
in 1989, it turned out that the radio interface used to transmit
electronic cash sometimes led to unwanted results. For in-
stance, users accidentally touching their pockets found that
they unwillingly paid a near-by bus. Also, gates in ski-resorts
opened or remained closed unexpectedly because the gate had
communicated with a different device than the user believed
it had. In project CAFE, using infrared for communicating
anonymous cash, pointing was possible. Here, the issue of
replay arose, with avoiding double payment. These problems
need smart solutions with any contactless interface (see Sta-
jano and Anderson [32] who recommend contact).
3. Tamper Resistant Components
Different levels of tamper resistance and tamper evidence
are possible. One option is to use smartcards. This can mean
one or possibly two smartcards of standard bank card size, or
one or several of smaller size, as they are used with GSM
mobile phones. Alternatively, other form factors can be used.
One option is steel buttons (Dallas Semiconductor), another
one PCMCIA-cards, and a third is even larger PCI-boards as
produced by IBM for use, e.g., in banking. Larger comp o-
nents may have the advantage of storing more data unen-
crypted, yet securely. Also, they may have sophisticated in-
trusion detection mechanism and zeroisation circuitry (Fig.
3). Of course, the design needs to be evaluated against differ-
ent attacks, such as power consumption analysis.
For protection against the threat of the device being stolen,
manipulated and returned, the whole device may have to have
protection making tampering evident. This can well be com-
bined with holograms for visualising the authenticity of a
device, and with challenge-and-response procedures for rec-
ognising one’s own device.
A securely designed device, combined with appropriate
tamper resistance, also has the potential to substitute for spe-
cial tamper resistant PIN-pads, as they are used in cash dis-
pensers by some banks. This would allow for the production
of cheap home-ATMs.
4. Other Components
The devices may have to be equipped with suitable storage
and back-up media. The usage of solar cells could provide for a
high availability. Note that this may be in contrast to the tradi-
tional requirement of high speed, which governed the design of
security chips, e.g., for use at the point of sale.
C. Combinations
1. Types of Devices
Future devices will be differentiated in terms of storage,
tamper resistance, etc. This will mean that devices will have
scope and costs. Note that the inclusion of user input and out-
put into a smartcard of normal thickness (.76 mms) is hard to
achieve. Already in 1989 Toshiba built a “Supersmartcard”,
which, however, had only a very small display, and a difficult
to operate keyboard.
Regarding the costs, based on interviews with experts, it
appears that in large volumes, the price of the components as
mentioned above should not hinder diffusion. I.e. for private
use, with a normal smartcard, it should be possible to develop
devices with small user input and output for costs in the range
of Euro 50. This assumes the production of around 1 mio
devices. These costs could even be smaller if the components
were integrated into a mobile phone, PDA or palmtop com-
puter. For higher values or maximum “peace of mind”, com-
ponents for re-designed PDAs with higher tamper resistance
could probably be manufactured for costs in the range of
Euro 100 - 200. It may even be that such a cost level can be
achieved with volumes of 100,000 only. Such volumes
should not be too difficult to achieve, given the number of
self-employed persons, people trading stock, representatives
of SMEs, etc. The estimates are mentioned because it has
been believed that the marginal costs of such secure devices
would rather be in the range of Euro 1,000. I was not able to
learn about components which, if manufactured in large
quantities, would justify such prices. It will require, however,
some effort to make more precise estimates, and to discover
market segments in which there is a match of willingness to
pay with the production costs for a device capable of han-
dling a given document size and having a certain level of
tamper resistance.
2. Types of Applications
Secure computers could very well be used with all sorts of
business applications, on the Internet or at the Point of Sale,
such as signed offers, orders, payments, receipts, etc. Note
that with them, if combined with Mixes and eCash, untrace-
able sales and banking become possible. Other fields of ap-
plications are the storage of passwords, electronic tickets and
other valuable information. Last but not least applications for
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Assuming one wishes to use a mobile device for securing
business processes, the question arises whether it should be
combined with a mobile phone. In first interviews made, re-
spondents expressed two possible views. One opinion ex-
pressed is that signing with secure hardware should work “via
my Palm Pilot or mobile phone. No new device, one should
build upon what exists.” Another opinion is, however, that
secure hardware for signing “should be separate. Otherwise
I’d have the problem: ‘Give it to me’ and the other one makes
a phone call. Then the whole mechanism is in hands in which
it should not to be. Or it gets left somewhere.” [44] How
many companies will agree or disagree with the storage of
business secrets in mobile phones or PDAs?
V. CONCLUSION
Given the possibility of an open, highly secure design,
combined with a high level of tamper resistance and a proper
user identification, there is an option to manufacture devices
which in practical terms can be used to achieve full binding-
ness and confidentiality. Of course, in a theoretical sense,
there will be no 100% security. There is always a possibility
that somebody has broken the system. But it seems the state-
ment “there is no 100% security” has been abused too often
for selling components with known weaknesses when being
used in insecure computers. With the technologies mentioned
it should be possible to make attacks “completely implausi-
ble”, as one expert put it. This means that if somebody has a
liability limit of, e.g., Euro 2,000, using a smartcard to store
secrets, a secure system with user I/O as sketched above should
leave no risk that this person gets impersonated if the device is
lost or stolen. Similarly, with higher levels of tamper resistance
and even more sophisticated user identification, it should be
possible to make it completely implausible that a transaction
worth Euro 1 mio. gets attacked. With a secure design of hard-
and software, it should also be possible to encrypt business
information in a way that it is practically impossible to decrypt
it.
Two migration paths currently appear feasible. One is to
turn the current move to Linux into a move towards a secure
Linux, usable by laypersons. The other one is to turn mobile
phones into secure computers. Somewhat stylised, the two
paths have certain pros and cons, as visualised in Table 1.
Whatever option chosen, there will be some costs for tamper
resistance and the crypto applications. Actually these might be
offset by an increase in performance of a secure system and the
smaller resources needed. Thus, peace of mind should become
achievable for all users of signature and encryption solutions.
TABLE 1






Convenient interface for business use/large
documents
x
Convenient encryption of business secrets x
Suitable for supplementing PCs with traditional
OS, for signatures only
x
Suitable for highest tamper resistance or secure
PIN-pads
x a
Personal control b x
Easy portability x
Suitability for mobile transactions, e.g., at point
of sale
x
Suitable for chips free of Trojan horses x c
a Large parts of phone can be made tamper resistant.
b With a PDA-phone, one could take the keys out when handing it over.
c Likely it is cheaper to control a few phone chips
Fig. 3. Membrane for intrusion detection (Gore)
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